Shared judgements: thinking for yourself, thinking from the standpoint of everyone else, and being consistent

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1 Introduction

Let's assume that we value art and design but at the same time have deep anxieties about how far the practices and products of art and design could in principle be proper topics of assessment, or perhaps a proper subject for assessment by methods imposed on us by currently fashionable authority. Behind this anxiety lies a dilemma: could we consistently value the disciplines of art and design as a proper domain for education, and have a quite general anxiety about assessment? For the concept of assessment incorporates the idea of the possibility of shared judgements; and that amounts to the possibility of a common sense of attainable values in this area. Can we give an account of this?

This conference is concerned with appropriate paradigms of knowledge, even with what paradigms of knowledge might be appropriated from elsewhere to the field of art and design, perhaps to incur a proper respectability on a practice we wish to defend. The big issue is thus, of course, why we might feel the need for such a defence. But to ask this is to ask not just a question about knowledge but at the same time a question about the communication of common understanding. Private, arcane or secret knowledge is not to the point 1.

Anxiety about what paradigms of knowledge may be applied to the assessment of performance and products in art and design may seem odd. For even on the most rigidly unimaginative conception of academic assessment - in any area - other categories of criteria tend to be acknowledged. Guidelines and benchmarking documents refer to skills ('transferable skills' of course) and to 'understanding' and to 'independent thought'. On this account only part of any assessment criteria lists knowledge of bodies of facts, or even collections of recalled theories or opinions, the bulk of the set of criteria identifies quite different things, not listable information but recognisable and shareable virtues.

If we are determined to suppose that what is assessable is all sorts of knowledge there is no doubt that we can construct a capacious enough hold-all to carry most of what we want into most sorts of examinations (including those concerned with art and design). The task

left to us (of assessing assessment) may then seem to be the fairly simple one of unpacking these hampers and sorting their contents. My claim here is that this could even in principle be a simple task is an illusion.. Before we ask what can be known we should ask what can be shared. We need an account of shared judgements. The core problem is what it is to have a common judgement where the topics of such judgement are not words but mostly non-linguistic works.

'Judgement,' and the cognate 'criticism', are terms that come in bitter and sweet flavours: tolerant or liberal people are asked not to be judgmental or over critical. We have good reason to fear the sorts of judgements and criticism that cramps our liberty to be valued as in freedom we should be valued, not to have alien values (values alien to us that are) imposed on us willy nilly. If we judge the arts we are not magistrates, and should avoid the magisterial. But there is a sweeter concept of judgement that matters far more. It has two aspects. The first is the idea, common enough in ‘ordinary’ thinking as well as in philosophical thought that 'judgement' refers to what we use when we have run out of formulaic guides, check lists, and algorithms and yet still have to carry on thinking - to use our judgement. This applies in any area. The other aspect concerns independent thought engaging with other independent thought. If the concept of knowledge can be applied to contexts in which judgement crucial it is these fact that we have to confront at the outset.

Knowledge and what can be taught

Plato's question in the Meno, 'Can virtue be taught?' moves without any apparent break in continuity to the different question whether virtue is knowledge and if so how it may be learned. Notoriously, the dialogue fails to answer its own question. However, by implication the suggestion that at least geometrical knowledge is recovered by a form of recollection (based on the example of leading the untutored slave boy through the proof that the square on a diagonal is twice the area of the original square) might plausibly be taken to suggest that much the same might be said of knowledge of the difference between Right and Wrong, or of we like, of The Good. The Socratic doctrine that virtue is a form of knowledge leaves it to subsequent debate (notably between Platonic conceptions and Aristotelian ones) to decide what concept of knowledge was appropriate for this. But what is equally if not more significant is that the Meno's overt question concerned the idea of teachability and the intimately related idea of what criteria we might have for the success of such teaching. Manifestly if the teaching of virtue is in question instructing a pupil to recite a form of words, as a catechism was not going to fill the bill. Merely knowing what is supposed to be right action is not equivalent to genuinely (and presumably testably) knowing what virtue is. But why not? One reason, implied by Aristotle in the Ethics is that knowledge has to be internalised, 'has to be worked into the living texture of the mind, and this takes time' 2. On this view what teaching, if teaching is possible at all, has to inculcate, needs to develop as a kind of deeply engrained skill. But this must be more than merely knowing how to do something as opposed to knowing what is to be done, but rather the development of a kind of character that makes appropriate action second nature.

What is second nature comes eventually without further conscious reflection, without further reference to check lists or statements of aims, objectives or learning outcomes. If this is the goal of education as opposed to mere instruction, the current obsession with such things by our political and academic masters is profoundly against the grain of this ancient tradition which we still like to think informs the heart of our system of shared post - Enlightenment values. What I have to say here is thus motivated by a sense of crisis, not a dramatic one to be sure (the oppression of civilisation is far more dramatic elsewhere in the contemporary world) but one that is subtle and insidious enough.

That apart, the philosophical thought here moves inexorably from the idea of virtue (Socratic or Platonic) as right action to the rather deeper Aristotelian idea of virtue as character, the living of which constitutes the good life. This familiar (very general) scenario about moral virtue may be repeated in smaller scale by anyone who has ever worried about what can be taught in a good system of education that is not a mere 'learnery' (in Ezra Pound's phrase). It could certainly be applied to any examination of the proper virtues of philosophy departments or schools of art and design. But such a scenario, familiar as it is, begs a question. The question concerns communication, not just from teacher to student, but back again from student to teacher – from the assessed to the assessor.

These thoughts lead me to ask an essentially Aristotelian question in a Kantian style. The Aristotelian question is this. Is art education (or any other sort of education, as opposed to mere training) really possible? The question is not whether the institutions of art education are fraudulent, but whether they can properly be said to be engaged in any special educational task not engaged in by other forms of teaching, of the imparting of knowledge and skill. What are the constitutive virtues (and avoidable vices) that such education may properly seek to inculcate? Another way of putting that question is to ask whether the forms of common understanding that apply to other areas can have a serious analogue in the area with which we are concerned at this conference. (That's the Kantian style). For what is being inculcated is not how to produce theories, reports, theses (linguistic items of propositional knowledge) but rather how make the products of art and design - to make them well and how to make progress in doing so. Since my own philosophical loyalties are to an essentially analytic tradition of doing philosophy, I should perhaps acknowledge that it is in my view a distinct weakness of that tradition that it has a prejudice against non-propositional (non–linguistic) products as the outcome of educable thought. I believe this to be a mere prejudice. That prejudice is not confined to the analytic tradition of philosophy. So with that in mind, let's turn to Kant. The issues he raises are, I suggest, of the utmost relevance today.

2 Kant's maxims of common human understanding

On the face of it Kant's discussion, which concentrates on the problems of communication and of publicity in the context of the arts (or aesthetic judgement) does so at the cost of leading us a long distance away from the idea of knowledge. It will eventually lead us back there, and the digression is important.

Kant's typically formal way of putting things is to propose that we attend to the differences and analogies between what he calls the 'sensus communis aestheticicus' and 'sensus communis logicus' Of course the mere fact that Kant can produce these contrasting labels is no reason to suppose that both or either corresponds to a reality. Even Kant seems to have doubts about this. In the Forth Moment, which first introduces the idea of a 'common sense' in aesthetics as a development of his claim that the aesthetic faculty is that of being able to 'communicate universally without recourse to concepts', he puts the issue in the form of a question whether we should presuppose such a common sense, not as a mere assertion that we do have a right to do so. What we can ask, however, is what the thought that they might be two sorts of 'common sense' should lead us to take seriously. It is as if the practice of the arts - a culture that incorporates such practice – must, for Kant, celebrate a grounded hope of a very specific sort.

On the face of it Kant's discussion leads us a long distance away from the idea of knowledge. It will eventually lead us back there, and the digression is important. I shall thus engage in a little Kantian (re) construction.

The problem of communication in the arts is in effect the running theme of sections 40-50 of the Third Critique (which also contain the bulk of Kant's somewhat disorganised discussion of the different arts). It is reasonable to consider it as being really concerned with the very idea of the transmission of thought feeling within the institutions and the products of the arts. One issue that certainly plays a large part in his discussion in this long section of the Critique concerns the very possibility of education in the arts and culture. It is one of the most neglected aspects of Kant's discussion, and though it manifestly emerges from a late Eighteenth Century set of anxieties rather than from those of the very early Twenty First Century, the underlying issues are, I think, still with us. Here he returns to the theme of taste as a kind of sensus communis which had been the topic of the Fourth Moment. 'Common human understanding,' he remarks, ‘which as mere sound (not yet cultivated) understanding, is looked upon as the least we can expect from anyone claiming the name of man has therefore the doubtful honour of having the name common sense (sensus communis) bestowed upon it'. This should be thought of as a 'public sense i.e. a critical faculty which in its reflective act takes account (a priori)of the mode of representation of every one else, in order, as it were, to weigh its judgement with the collective reason of mankind'.This is accomplished by weighing the judgement, not so much with actual as with the merely possible, judgments of others, and by putting ourselves in the position of everyone else as the result of a mere abstraction from the limitations which contingently affect our own estimate' 3. (We might very well doubt this anthropological optimism, but it is well worth suspending such doubt at this stage. In any case, as I have said, Kant partly anticipates it.)

At first sight these maxims seem to be extrapolated from the metaphysics of ethics to be forced into in a new context, and Kant himself seems to be embarrassed by this. They seem to recycle the Groundwork principles of autonomy of action, respect for the autonomy of others and of rational consistency. The categorical imperative seems to be re-applied to principles of communication. But how are we to interpret these dicta as 'maxims'? Are we to read them as recommendations about what to communicate or as stating the conditions of successful communication, even as providing an account of what constitutes communication?

In an extended explanation of these remarks, which certainly seem at first sight pretty unconvincing as a description of how a maker of a work - a composing or designing artist - could in principle think, he offers a digression on the so-called 'maxims of common human understanding'. These are (1) 'think for oneself, (2) think from the standpoint of every one else and (3) always think consistently'. 'the first is the maxim of unprejudiced thought, the second of enlarged thought, the third of consistent thought' He adds at the end of his discussion that it is in this context (i.e. that of aesthetic communication) that the last maxim is 'hardest of attainment, and is only attainable by the union of both the former, and after constant attention to them has made one at home in their observance 4. The core problem of education in art and design - involving any idea of the transmission of art and design knowledge - centres, I suggest, on how we might construe this pregnant remark.

With some mild charity of interpretation we might well see how these maxims might be put to students of discursive academic disciplines. We require (for example) of a student writing a philosophy essay that they think for themselves (and make their references as clear as possible when they are merely using borrowed arguments, else they will be

convicted of plagiarism) to think from the standpoint of others (at least to try to imagine readers to whom they must try to make what they say clear) and at the very least be consistent (at the very least check, as far as they can, that their arguments are valid even if their premises may be less securely grounded than they suppose). At least such advice will do as a start. In a general way we assume that any good student who has internalised the beginnings of the virtues of an academic discipline must take such principles for granted.

The idea of a discipline

It is worth noting that this kind of advice is relevant to any standardly knowledge-based academic discipline, whether a writer is concerned to organise or marshal facts of one sort or another, report arguments or explore possible conclusions. Given that start, a student will worry about just what is to count as thinking for themselves, about what precisely might count as an original idea ('well, at least begin by using your own words') about how to imagine the appropriate sceptical reader, and about how to check for consistency when engaged in the flow of an informal argument. These are the normal running anxieties of the task. Hence we might say that being constrained by such anxieties is constitutive, even if not wholly constitutive, of such compositional thought - in any field. What is significant is that how to overcome such anxieties may also constitute what it is to understand the constraints of communication in one particular field as opposed to another - will, in other words doing so constitutes what it is to accept a subject-area as a discipline. Students (and not just beginning students) of any discipline live with the anxieties of how to apply these maxims. What makes a discipline a necessary community of ideas - an arena of not merely shared, but disputed judgement - is that none of us can get by without more than a little help from our friends.

We need, however, far more charity of interpretation to apply (even analogies for) these maxims to the context of aesthetic communication, as understood by Kant. He is well aware of this. Accordingly, he introduced the maxims merely as an analogy. Something like them constitutes communication in this very different area of 'aesthetic rather than intellectual judgement'. He goes on to say,

I resume the thread of the discussion interrupted by the above digression, and I say that taste can with more justice be called a sensus communis than can sound understanding; and that the aesthetic, rather than the intellectual, judgement can bear the name of a public sense, i.e. taking it that we are prepared to use the word 'sense' of an effect that mere reflection has upon the mind; for then by sense we mean the feeling of pleasure. We might even define taste as the faculty of estimating what makes our feeling in a given representation universally communicable without the mediation of a concept.' 5

Negotiating the analogies and disanalogies. Indeterminate concepts and consistency

What Kant seems to be saying here seems strange. For if taste itself that constitutes the faculty of communication, the problem is that we are not told - certainly not told directly - what the medium of such communication is to be. If we can't rely on the 'mediation of a concept' (since we are not concerned with conceptually, semantically, constrained linguistic discourse) we still need to know what the means of communication is. Without that talk of taste as a 'faculty' is quite un-illuminating. (Kant cannot mean that we communicate telepathically in such cases!). What candidates could fill the bill? Perhaps it will be what we say or indicate to others in expressing our aesthetic judgements, where 'without the 'mediation of a concept' should be taken to mean merely that we don't rely on

demonstrative arguments. This is a view often ascribed to Kant. An alternative would be that is works of art themselves, poetry (which uses language but does so non-discursively) or by non-linguistic means of communication, painting, drawing, music, dance and so on. In fact my own interpretation is that he means something like both: when we are 'suitors for the agreement of others' concerning our aesthetic reactions to natural objects it will be that the medium of such an appeal will be how we solicit the attention of others to conform to our own (how we invite their imaginative 'take' on what we contemplate to conform to our own). In the case communication in the arts it will be works themselves that constitute their own medium of communication. If we are to avoid a regress in the account this forces us to think of our mutual sharing of the subjective phenomenology our aesthetic responses and comparable to tiny, if amateurish, ''works'. In my view he does think something like this and that is not in principle absurd. If so there will be an analogy between the constraints of common understanding and the constraints of 'imagination in its freedom'. It is then the publicity of a work of art - something which expresses a 'play of imagination' via a 'representation' available to others (a representation of how we attend - of the 'intentional content' of our responses) - which must somehow guarantee what Kant calls a 'public sense'. Kant puts it like this,

Only when the imagination in its freedom stirs the understanding, and the understanding apart from concepts puts the imagination into regular play, does the representation communicate itself not as thought, but as an internal feeling of a final state of mind. 6

What is Kant excluding here? He articulates his argument in terms of a set of unexplained contrasts between thought and feeling, between the cognitive and the non-cognitive which are fraught with difficulties, and , it has to be said, not used by him with total consistency.

As a way of revealing the difficulties Kant has to overcome let’s take the problems with the analogy of the maxims in reverse order, starting with the third, manifestly the most difficult.

Maxim three: being consistent

It is not hard to see why in this context the third maxim of consistency is problematic. The very idea of consistency in thought and communication, even of moral consistency in action, seems to depend on the idea of concepts. It is concepts, meanings, uses of words, whether in argument of in description that may be consistent or inconsistent with each other. What could consistency be in other (non-linguistic) contexts if we do not have the normal semantics of language to guide us? In most theoretical (linguistic) contexts we might suppose that consistency is the easy condition to meet; even if we are in doubt about the truth of a set of claims we may at least test them for consistency. Indeed we should do this first if we are even to understand what it is the truth of which we are to enquire into. But here the situation is radically different. Kant’s account of aesthetic judgement as 'non-cognitive' seems to mean more (and perhaps less) than that judgements of taste have no objective truth conditions attached to them, so do not deliver knowledge. This is a very strong claim. But it is too strong to carry conviction. Kant was clearly attracted to it, if he held back from fully embracing it. It seems to be the reason why in this context he (sometimes) rejects the idea of thought for that of feeling. Certainly, in the context of this present discussion such an interpretation would obviate the question of knowledge from the outset. Moreover, how we imaginatively attend to something, how we might dream about it, or fantasise about it, might surely be describable in more or less clear, conceptually ordered words: this would be denied too.

His doctrine seems to have been unstable within his account. Later in the discussion in the Critique - after the section called the 'antinomy of taste' in which he resolves the antinomy with the claim that such judgements make use of 'indeterminate concepts'- it seems that 'determinate concepts' is what is ruled out in the communication of taste . It is not fully clear what he means by this. 'Indeterminate' cannot mean 'vague' or 'inexact' or 'fuzzy'. There seem to be two possible candidates for what is involved here. One the one hand he refers to 'the indeterminate idea of the supersensible within us' which we have to assume and cannot further explain. It is clear from the context of his discussion that while he thinks we can't prove the existence of such a faculty, and certainly cannot reduce its principles to algorithms, we can manifest it in our capacity to communicate not by 'precepts', (linguistically formulated principles) but by what he calls 'demonstrations'. This fits well with the conception of judgement that is not a slave to formulae; it also suggests that the objects of such 'demonstrations' must, as it were, take the place of the verbal articulation of concepts. So we communicate by the sharing of objects of aesthetic judgement where such sharing cannot be reduced to linguistic formulae.

A more specific conception of 'indeterminate concepts' might, perhaps, be this. Consider the idea of a concept applied 'without measure', as he puts it. Compare the idea concept of vastness in his discussion of the sublime. The sublime is at one point defined as that which is 'absolutely great'. 'Absolutely' means here not infinitely great but 'great without measure': a concept in this context is indeterminate when it is not restricted in its application by the limits of measurement. Hence (for Kant and for any contemporary use of the idea of the Sublime in the late 18th Century and the later Romantic tradition) the comparative vastness of the appearance of (say) Snowdon or Mont Blanc is not questioned by an estimate of the actual heights of these mountains above sea level. In fact the two accounts belong together. The content of such judgements is objects of aesthetic admiration - objects (e.g. natural objects or works of art) as-attended-to - how we 'aspect' them not how we describe them when we report facts about them. The difference between natural objects and the products of art or design would then be that the latter incorporate or embody the imaginative content of their maker's work, while the former provide occasions for 'demonstration'.

But this still leaves us with the problem of consistency. Whatever we are to make of what he says Kant is presenting us with real problems concerning what is to count as consistency in this context. We might wonder whether anything could or indeed whether anything should do so. If we value the metaphorical the imaginatively bizarre, the absurd, the disturbing challenge to our understanding of the sublime, and Kant himself values most of these, we might well wonder whether consistency is even a virtue in art. Consistency is boring. Boring is just what no half decent product of design or fine art should ever be. Significantly this is not a response he invites. Consistency is said to be difficult not impossible to understand or achieve. We certainly need a charitably loose reading of what is involved here If Kant is right there are ambiguities in the very idea of consistency that need far more exploration than he was prepared to provide.

.What is clear, then is that for Kant aesthetic communication - and thus any corresponding concept of consistency - requires that the communication that achieves common understanding must be mediated by objects of shared judgements (either natural objects or works of art), and that this cannot be avoided by any ambitious reduction to independent description. If descriptions come into the picture, as the clearly must, they will be irreducibly parasitic on such particular cases. In art and design it will thus be that at the end of the day attention to an exhibited case, a work of an exhibited object whose role it is to mediate communication. (Our research, we could say, is into practice itself, not into

descriptions of practice). On this Kant seems to me to be essentially right. It then follows that if there is to be space for the idea knowledge in this context it will be those particular objects of shared judgement that must be the objects of knowledge. But this idea of particularity still sits ill with that of consistency. It still remains to be seen whether an idea of consistency could emerge from an understanding of the first two maxims.

Maxim two
Thinking for others: what could count as sharing judgements?

The second maxim, if taken literally, seems absurd. Respecting the standpoint of everyone else might be a reasonable maxim to attempt to follow (though we might wish to be excused respect for complete lunatics). But to think from everyone else's point of view would surely be impossible even for God. Is this maxim to be followed distributively or collectively? If distributively how could we have time to run through all alternative points of view, assuming we could know what they were, if collectively how could we think all the (inconsistent) alternatives at once? Again, charity of reading here suggests a milder and vaguer reading namely, that what we are be enjoined to think is how we think might seem, if expressed as well as we may manage, to all sorts of other points of view. A painter, however original, however new an startling his work has to be, on this view, not only a beholder of his own work (a point insisted on by Wollheim) 7 but also to imagine himself as all sorts of other beholders. It is not clear whether or not that maxim could be followed. A charitable reconstruction will not be straightforward. For, on the most charitable interpretation, we are presented with a dilemma. If the maker of a work attempts to imagine how the least well-placed, least sympathetic observer will attend to what he had made he must be doomed to failure. Nobody could expect to communicate with everyone - with every possible observer. On the other hand if he only imagines another beholder placed just as he his he will at best 'communicate' only with himself - which is no communication at all. To produce a work capable of 'public' appreciation must be to imagine a set of possible beholders placed somewhere between these two extremes. What could be the conditions for this?

Note, however, this problem is by no means confined to 'imaginative' communication, or to artistic communication. A student attempting to imagine a reader for an essay will have the same difficulty; to imagine a reader unlike themselves, but sufficiently well-informed and sufficiently intellectually sympathetic to be both intrigued by and receptive to the finished composition may be up against quite as hard a task. (I have this problem in preparing this talk, or preparing any lecture; more often than not I fail). Indeed this is the reason why intellectual and academic disciplines develop as they do. We often think of a discipline a primarily a source of criteria of achievement - a community of obedient disciples who know the rules, are well-disciplined - so that passing a peer review or passing an examination is what disciplines permit. But this regulatory role, important as it is, is subsidiary to a far less regulatory, far more friendly, institution of a culture of imaginative and intellectual cooperation and trust. It will fail unless this is recognised. 'Universal communication' in Kant's perhaps over-optimistic phrase, requires a culture of trust before it can achieve any possibility of a community of regulation. This is why for Kant the idea of a sensus communis requires a corresponding idea of sociability.

Stepping from the somewhat high-falutin abstractions of Kantian discourse what might this mean in practice? Surely not just that a sociable community is a nicer place to work in than an untrusting, indifferent or censorious one. What is at stake is that for the very idea of a common sense to have a place as locating its own practice, it must be essential first that

any institution of art education must exhibit these virtues of trust, curiosity and cooperation and then that the 'culture' that spreads from such institutional practices must reflect them too. This is why for Kant the institutions of aesthetic judgement lay the foundation for a 'continually progressive culture' 8. Memos to our academic masters might do well to reflect this fact: constant checking of standards of attainment set out by 'objectives' and 'benchmarks' while useful in a crisis, will, if pursued in indifference to these deeper matters, inevitably tend to undermine their own, supposedly, high purposes.

A parallel with Kantian ethics may be worth noting here. Kant's categorical imperative requires that we will that the maxim of any of our actions be adopted as a universal law of nature. In practice how we may will such a thing may be beyond our powers of imagination. Prejudice thus may inhibit our reflective will. How the way we act might legitimately be regarded by those whose view-point is radically different from our own, or who may be people we hate and distrust so much that we cannot bring ourselves to even start to imagine their point of view, may be beyond our imaginative will - or our will to imagine. (Consider Israel versus Palestine.) Since for Kant 'ought' implies 'can' what under such circumstances remains of the imperative? Kant does not directly consider this. The clear implication must be that imaginatively driven 'sociability', while not itself a moral system, must be the condition of it. The Good Will presupposes generosity of imagination. The deep connection between Kant's ethics and his aesthetics lies in this conception of sociability 9. This is one of the reasons why a culture of co-operation is both (for Kant, and should be for us) a condition, and an outcome of, a morally functional society. Art education, as we are considering it here, can't only be about art education 10.

Maxim one
Thinking for yourself: how to be independent

The first maxim (of independent thought) may seem straightforward enough, but again too literal an interpretation would be puzzling. (In fact would be puzzling in any area.). Thinking entirely for oneself, so 'originally', so independently, that the thought exhibited in its product bore no intelligible connection to the thinking of others would clearly be absurd. Such independence would be achieved at the cost of unintelligibility, both to others and to the thinker herself. Indeed it hardly needs argument that independent thought (whether we call it original or creative) can only arise within the context of some origin within a past and shared tradition. Originality, does not merely originate, it does so only in terms of its having origins. If it is a departure it must be a departure from something. Recognising the new requires that such recognition be against the background of, thus within the context of, some tradition. If this is to be a maxim of communication, such a context needs to be shared by both the thinker and other beholders and interpreters. A charitable reading of the first maxim thus requires that to follow it we must need at the same time to follow the second maxim. It is this fact that will make the third maxim intelligible.

The reason for this is that to 'make ourselves at home' in the observance of either of the first two maxims is to be at home within a culture, a community of imaginative sociability. The clear implication of Kant's account is that this will begin to provide the conditions for understanding (or indeed applying) the maxim of consistency. So what kind of institutional practice should that commit us to?

3 Institutions of art education the vices of the academy

Imagine a stereotypically academic art school in which all the students slavishly follow instructions and recipes 11. None of them think for themselves. (Groups of philosophy

students may behave in much the same way). Any conscientious teacher, or the odd rebellious student, will respond by more or less furiously, sometimes despairingly, begging the poor kids to at least try to think for themselves, at least try to develop some individual talent, however modest. If the first maxim comes trippingly off the tongue: 'for God's sake think for yourselves!' It will surely do so as something very like a moral injunction: 'what we want from you is not merely good work but your own good work'. Manifestly ordering other people to behave thus will be as self -stultifying as a bossy host instructing guests to start making bright conversation, and even the very best students can be paralysed the fear and guilt such precepts may engender. But Kant's direction of attention is significantly different here: for him a failure to follow the first maxim risks, in a mild form 'prejudice' and, in a more severe form, 'superstition'. Each vice is for him the result of not heeding an injunction to what he terms 'never passive thought', but the passivity he warns against is that of being lead by others. Above all the first maxim is the principle of autonomy of thought and feeling. But for that reason it is inevitably at the same time a principle of communication as a condition of common understanding. This maxim is very close neighbour to the standard demand that students should not plagiarise. Rightly we think of plagiarism as a crime, as a form of fraud or theft. What we seek to assess is the student's own work not just any work. There are two reasons for this. The obvious one is that it is students' abilities we wish to have evidence for, but this would not be of much interest if it were not for the deeper reason that we value autonomy of thought and imagination for its own sake. (The Kantian ethical principle of valuing other agents as ends in themselves, because they are agents with their own ends, clearly lurks in the wings). It would be a particularly vicious form of hypocrisy - not unknown in academic contexts- to punish plagiarism simply because it breaks the rules of examinations while not providing the maximum help to students to learn to think for themselves, to go beyond mere reporting, however honestly presented.

But the implications of this take us further. In the context or the arts these principles commit us to the conception of art (however little it has 'recourse to concepts') as a form of communication, and thus to the idea that the institutions of art education to be uncompromisingly committed to the values of communication between often radically different people. Plagiarism, the crime of presenting the work of another as ones own work so as to get illegal credit is the mirror image of forgery, of fraudulently presenting ones own work as that of another in order to gain credit for the work. In any context where we think of such practices as crimes, however, we are committed to supposing that the work is evidence of the thought of whoever made it. However fashionable the idea of the death of the author, or the absence of the artist, may be (and I have little sympathy for it) the idea of the vanishing student would rob education of all sense. Examinations test students via the work, not merely the product itself, as something that floats free of its origins. So the question, inherent in this maxim, perhaps not pursued enough by Kant, is why it is that we value and how do we identify those forms of thought that may be evidenced by its outcome?

A contrasting stereotype would be a situation where the free for all of self expression has got completely out of hand. One of the less comfortable aspect of much avant garde art is its lack of consideration for the beholder, indifference to the imaginative question 'how might this appear to someone uninstructed in this area?' or even simply '...to someone else'. Even if that thought experiment is hard to perform it is surely worth attempting. I was invited to attend an exhibition of students' work in Fine Art for a London art school that had fallen on very difficult times. For reasons that it would be embarrassing to go into the students had been forced to hire a warehouse in which to exhibit their own work. It was obvious that the installations presented were mostly very highly talented. That they were

hard to construe at first sight was not a problem. What was a problem was that the way they were exhibited made them almost impossible to attend to- even literally to see from a convenient vantage point. Wondering about this, while it was obvious that they had received very little help in exhibiting their work, it also became apparent that it had not really occurred to them to ask how it might appear to others seeing it. (Even to each other). Their comment on this was a kind of bewilderment: as one of them put it. 'I do this for myself, not for others'. Since this was one of the students who had been charming enough to invite me along I found this staggering. What seemed to be the case was that this particular group of students had lost the trick of even sharing attention to one another's work. The previous year, when the department they belonged to had been fully and very excellently staffed, none of this had been apparent. Perhaps I exaggerate. Neither kind of school is likely to be as completely impoverished as these stories suggest. But to understand the maxims we do need to imagine dysfunctional cases. Here, in the case that ignores the second maxim, the point is that any work, if it is to communicate, requires a context of sociability (Kant's key word in this context) in which it is possible to make an appeal to the judgement of others. Sociability institutionalises an appeal, not (or not for Kant) a demand. As he puts it 'we are suitors' for the agreement of others: a suitor can't demand, but should have the right to hope, and to understand the conditions of hope.

The pattern that emerges then is that to follow - even to grasp the point of each maxim requires we begin to grasp the implications of the next in line. Far from being separate principles, that may have to be played off against each other, they make up an integrated whole. The function of the whole is to lead a would-be independent thinker into a wider community. The implications for education - especially education in the arts and in design should be manifest.

4 Imparting and assessing Knowledge: process knowledge and compositional skill

Art and design education is traditionally above all concerned to develop skills and capacities of creativity in compositional and design competence. While Kant tacitly acknowledges this he says nothing specific about these concepts 12. Rather, he tends to retreat to a somewhat conventional position for his time and talks of the capacity for such things, for which the conventional term is 'genius': for him genius is the capacity to originate (if we like in terms of the spirit of compliance with the first maxim) which needs to be moderated and disciplined by taste which (given his definition of taste as the capacity for 'universal communication') complies with the spirit of the second maxim but does so in terms of a suggestion of an unexplained (un-narrated) dialectic between the two faculties. If we are to reconstruct the missing narrative we will need to approach two questions, one about the processes of compositional originality and the other about its communication. To do either of these we have to move a significant distance from Kant himself. Let's take them in order.

On the processes of compositional thought I shall here, very briefly, re-cycle an account I put forward some long time ago 13. I then argued the following: firstly that there is no need for us to assume that all forms of thinking must be linguistically embodied or expressed. I suspect that for Kant the cognitive/non-cognitive divide corresponds to a large extent to this distinction. If so, if we can make sense of the concept of thought being directly expressible in non –linguistic activities we can at least begin to make progress with negotiating the first part of the analogical gap he invites us to traverse.

My suggestion was that we should take seriously Aristotle's' view that the conclusion of a practical syllogism (a form of thought that guides action) is not a self-addressed statement

that one ought to do something, but, rather, the relevant action itself. Kant would certainly have denied this. Consider the following two cases. Think, first of a not very competent, not very confident, learner driver who runs through the list of instruction about what he should do to change gear, following them as best he can as he goes. On the other hand think of someone who has learned how to drive. No such pattern of internal linguistic thought (or its possible translations) will run through his head. His thought that he should change gear and his decision to do so will be directly expressed in his action of doing so. He doesn't merely have a pattern of thought about his action: he will think in action. This is what it is to have a skill, including the skill of using a language. A fluent speaker of a new language doesn't have to tell himself what to say when he thinks what he does: he simply expresses his thought in language.

The second point I want to reiterate from the past is that is it not a necessary condition of rational thought that it should be directed towards explicit goal or ends that the agent has in mind. Kant, would almost certainly not agree of course; he insists that ends are required if the making of a work of art (whether designing a useful work of art which is for some definite end, or composing a work of fine art which may exhibit merely the form of finality, without end) should not be simply randomly connected with the makers action. The standard picture of rationality (Kant's conception of the hypothetical imperative, for example) is that the form of rational, purposive, thought-directed action is of an agent who wants, or seeks the end, sets out to achieve X, knowing Y leads to X thereby doing Y. This, if entirely general, implies that an activity, such as the activity of composing of designing something is non-rational to the extent that the agent cannot envisage its goals or may not even have any sense of a specifically desired outcome at the start of a compositional process. Yet I suggest we can all recognise that it is characteristic of concentrated compositional activity that recognition of goals and purposes emerge within its process. While most projects of this sort will have what I have called minimal ends, to write a good essay on topic x to compose or design a work of a certain sort, none of these descriptions will be sufficient to provide criteria in advance for what should turn out to be a successful completion. Instead, by a process which builds on serial decisions of preference, resolving conflicts and inconsistencies as the work is built up, the maker's own understanding of the core themes of the work is derived from retrospective recognition. It may be characteristic of such a process that the composer of designer will say at a culminating phase of the process 'Now I realise what it was that I really intended (or was trying to do) when I set out' but that this realisation , while essentially incorporating an autobiographical statement in the past tense, cannot be a memory claim. In Kierkegaard's phrase 'we live our lives forward but understand them backwards. This is not random, un-mindful, activity. What will be done within it will be deliberate intended, most often the concentrated application of thought; what is done will be done designedly but not for some previously envisaged design.

While this account certainly conflicts with Kant's general picture of rational action (typically enshrined in the principle of the hypothetical imperative in his ethical theory) it is not at all clear that he should have, or even perhaps would have, repudiated it as a picture of a compositional process that exercises the maker's equivalent of that 'free play of imagination' that would run parallel to his account of a beholder's aesthetic judgement. Kant's own description of compositional process, of 'a slow and even .painful process of improvement, directed to making the form adequate to his thought without prejudice to the freedom in play of those powers..' is not too far removed from this. Collingwood has a comparable account but he ties it to a story of emotional expression: there is no need for this, any more than there is a need to insist on Kant's assumed and unstable contrast between 'thought' and 'feeling' 14. The general account can apply just as well to the least

emotionally charged intellectual activity, for example composing an academic essay. The process of writing, just as much as a process of drawing or painting is itself a way of finding out what it is that you want to say, or want to make. There is no doubt that such processes are processes of knowledge, certainly of self-knowledge of evolving compositional intentions, decisions and beliefs. Attention to what you are doing directs a process of realisation, of recognition of what the overall thought is.

What emerges for the maker will be a conception of an overall design within the work that itself proceeds from within the process of its own making. This form of understanding comes before any conception of the successfully finished work and is often at odds with the self-conscious narratives of intention makers themselves offer. It is notorious that artists and composers of works of art (or even writers of philosophy or those engaged in scientific enquiry) may find the very idea of a finished or completed work either uninteresting arbitrary or baffling. The nearest one could get to a general description of completion is that 'any further imaginable step would spoil the project', but that presupposes that it is always possible to know that one has imagined all the relevant further steps. One might well rest content with simply leaving well alone. If the phrase had not been used by Kant for quite different philosophical purposes one might well be tempted to say that from the point of view of the maker what emerges within the process of compositional thought is a 'form of finality without end'. (Not interminable, that is, but not directed towards a pre-conceived end). A maker is concerned with the development of a composed form whose conception cannot be accounted for solely, perhaps sometimes not at all, in a prior conception of a product's function or final outcome.

A distinction might be insisted on at this point between products of 'pure 'art and products of design. It would run well along the lines of Kant's own thought to think of the majority of typical cases of design activity as being concerned with producing useful artefacts where (in terms of the well-known slogan of a later aesthetic tradition) (good) 'form follows function'. Kant was well aware of this distinction and treated such cases as 'dependant beauties' - as cases where the admiration such things evoke from us involves a mixture of types of judgements. In practice the distinction is not ever as sharp as theory might seem to suggest. Conceptions of ends play different roles in different works and products: what matters is that they can rarely be totally divorced from compositional thought.

Perhaps the temptation to pun here should not, after all, be fully resisted. For the account recalled here poses a problem for the idea of common understanding. I have found that many people have been ready to grant that this sort of process-thought may indeed capture what composing - 'Designing while making' - is from the point of view of the maker's thought. Doubts, however, abound over whether, even if this is granted, such observations can cast much light on what should count as the beholder's proper understanding. The doubts have much in common with traditional doubts in aesthetics concerning whether a concern with an artist's intentions should or even could have a place in an account of the understanding of the products of art 15. Sometimes, typically in drawing and painting where the patterns of the handling of materials are left on the page, as under-painting within brushwork or as pentimenti in drawing, we as beholders may find ways of decoding the patterns of composition. But there are many sorts of work, such as the completed products of design, or the final published text of a piece of literature or musical score, where all the conventions of good practice in the art of craft (the distinction is really unimportant in this context) is to disguise the evidence of how the final result was worked out. The thought-in-making, like many facts about the maker's intention or practical knowledge will be then systematically hidden from the beholder. Thus the process of knowledge that is essential to the maker will belong to the maker alone, will not be a

candidate for common understanding. The beholder, in a sense that distorts Kant's intentions, though not his words, has access to the 'end' of a process – to what is exhibited, made public, at the end of the composition, but not to the form of finality that precedes it. Perhaps this is a bad philosophical pun but puns can be illuminating and I am not certain that we should discard it.

These thoughts are given encouragement by reflecting on the recent Paul Klee retrospective exhibition at the Hayward gallery. Klee, as we all know, dedicated his artistic life to exploring the processes of creativity in painting and to teaching the results of his explorations. Perhaps in these post-modern times it is unfashionable to insist as I would do that the vision of the Bauhaus as one of the great monuments of civilisation, Germany's last contribution to the vision of the Enlightenment before the disaster of the Hitler's coming to power. But Klee can baffle us in two ways. First and most obviously, what we have, what we see in exhibitions and books of reproductions are works, not the process of Klee making them, however easily we may sometimes infer evidence of that from his use of materials. Secondly, less obviously, his pedagogical advice in notebooks or fragments of lectures do not make a system of instruction. They fall apart if we attempt to read them as if they were recipes for producing his type of paintings. As Kant put it, students require example not precepts. And we do have the examples. These lyrical, often deep, sometimes comic, compositions have as compositions (as 'abstract' paintings) 16 a subject matter which is the nature of Klee's exploration in making them.

But what, then, are we to make of his pedagogic notebooks? Do the pictures render them otiose? What is their place in the process of artistic communication? Their searching, persistent, analytic style is that of the pursuit of knowledge - knowledge of just the kind that we should suppose we have the right to expect as belonging specifically to the discipline of art and design. Surely if we seek a text that embodies research into practice it would be these careful and enthusiastic notebooks. But the status of what we might too loosely call 'contextualising' texts is a central problem in our understanding of art - especially the education and assessment of art. It is impossible to over-emphasise that no words can in principle stand in for, play the role of, the works or products they relate to 'however relevantly. (And much of the accompanying blurbs that people are encouraged to attached to their works or products have either scant relevance or are tacitly designed to avoid the test of the works themselves). Their role should be seen differently. It is to assist in establishing the culture (or 'mini-culture') of trust and informed imagination in which it becomes possible to engage with the works themselves. There is no doubt that beholders, even relatively sophisticated ones, need, and have the right to expect, as much help as they can get. The clues in Klee's notebooks and lectures which read as if they were an incomplete recipe for how to make his sort of art, are, rather, exemplifications of what it is to pay attention to what you (a student) may be doing when you attempt with more or less faltering steps to push beyond doodling towards designing. To us, the beholders of the works, they make comparable demands, to attend to the pictures as the outcome of an intense activity of mind, not doodling but strenuous visual thought. For Kant this sense of the presence of mind in the products of art is crucial. Art which is the outcome of authentic, autonomous activity has evident 'soul'. 'Soul' (Geist) 'says Kant, ‘in an aesthetical sense, signifies the animating principle of the mind' The works demand our attention because they signify the presence of mind in their making.

5 Conclusion: Knowledge and communication

To return to knowledge. My claim is that a necessary condition for a concept of knowledge within any possible teaching community is communicability, not only that but that

communicability requires a conception of a form of knowledge that is embodied within the creative process and is accessible via its outcome 17. Clearly this is not a sufficient condition since all sorts of things other than knowledge, error, confusion, incompetence, can, sadly enough, be communicated and taught. Such things can, sadly, also be assessed as if they were knowledge. To truly be knowledge somehow or other we need to show that error, confusion, incompetence is ruled out. That is, clearly, the hard part of the task, which is the first reason why we have educational. institutions of art and design. My concern is with an equally difficult preliminary problem. For, just as before we could entertain the doctrine that virtue is knowledge we have to establish that virtue can be taught, in other words that it is not arcane wisdom, so a similar hurdle has to be crossed in our present context. The problem with creativity – the presence of mind in making - spirit, geist, in Kant's terminology, is that it is all too easy to think of it as arcane, as incommunicably private and un-teachable. All too easily we can assume that what belongs to the mind of a maker had better stay there secure behind the barrier of his privileged access to his own mind. Aesthetic communication requires however that it is the products of such thinking in practical activity that is the location of communicability. If Kant's suggestions are even half-right it must then be our critical judgements about works (even student works) that constitute the analogy with 'general' 'common understanding'. For the transmission of the required sort of knowledge here must be by example, rather than by precepts.

Knowledge as publicly understood product and process

Any school of art and design could lay perfectly proper claim to communicate knowledge of the sort recognised elsewhere, if in different proportions. Knowledge of facts, learnable, recollected arguments, opinions, recipes and the corresponding knowledge of how to exercise appropriate skills. Such things can be transmitted by precept or practice and the successful outcomes of such attempts at transmission can be assessed with no more, if no less difficulty that assessing any other kind of course. One might well wonder then what might ground any anxiety about this, and clearly those who design teaching quality assurance devices to test 'learning outcomes', or research assessment criteria seem to have no such anxiety. But the problem of the communication of what Kant calls 'spirit' can't be reduced to these paradigms. Not being a slave to imparted precepts is not enough. What is further required is the communication via works of something more positive, the communication of thought as the outcome of the works' composition. To understand this we need to be able to construe the products of art and design as emerging from processes of thought and feeling that genuinely belong to them and are not merely borrowed from elsewhere.

This again has more than an analogy in other disciplines, but it is as well to be cautious about the forms of the analogy. Only rarely will the incorporation of something like pentimenti within the completed work be the sign of process; other means can be available depending on the discipline. A good essay in any discipline will carry the reader through a finished narrative of exposition and argument that has some correspondence to the thought behind it, but how this is revealed will depend significantly on the discipline of which it is a part. A philosophical meditation, which may also be a quite rigorous argument, may, as with Descartes' Meditations or (in a quite different manner) Hume's ironic writing, Kant's construction of his intellectual architecture, or Wittgenstein's Investigations, is designed, among other things, to take the reader on a journey of reflection that tracks the writer's own. We might think that the forms of exposition in the natural sciences seem specifically designed to avoid this in the interest of a conception of the search for objective knowledge embodied in the form of the writing which should be as impersonal as possible,

leaving the rough work firmly off the page. While true enough, this is to miss the point, which is rather that the very idea of the pursuit of knowledge as a collaborative activity determines a form of exposition that ideally invites the maximum of further collaboration. Such works are then part of a larger process (of pursuing knowledge) and their forms of exposition speak to that. Similarly in most literature the finalised, completed work, a poem or short story is designed to disguise the attempts the literary pentimenti that went into early composition. (William Blake's writing is a fortunate exception to this) 18. In the case of the products of art and design only some are apparently designed to exhibit their process within the work. We naturally associate this with the aesthetic of hand-made work, painting drawing, hand-made craft, and here different aesthetic programmes of exploration obviously vary widely so that it may be equally legitimate to disguise that aspect of process behind a celebration of finish that celebrates that the emergence from the early processes of making can be triumphantly hidden. Machine finishing - machine making - can be magnificent. But which ever way it goes either forms of stylistic excellence (or corresponding failure) are about process, about process hidden or revealed in, in these cases, a non-linguistic, so in Kantian terms, non-conceptual, product. So when we have to judge the product we are judging communicable knowledge?

What conception of knowledge is at stake here?

One way of forcing this question (suggested on the web-site for this series of conferences) is to ask whether it makes sense to grant a PhD to someone whose ‘result’ is not a thesis which reports a piece of knowledge as a result of research (of enquiry into a field) but a work of art or a product of design. Well, why not? After all, if it took knowledge, thought, hard work and investigation of how to achieve the result so why not reward the outcome?

But this misses the point behind the question. Perhaps we could ask whether the product appeals to our common human aesthetic understanding? That question is quite unhelpful as it stands. What I have tried here to make clear is that the conditions for the right recognising of assessable virtue in the arts not reducible to the conditions of propositonal understanding. They are complex in their own right, and thus require their own rich set of conditions for achievement. We might properly call that set of conditions a 'culture'. Then it is the task of art and design education (and associated institutions within society) to enable its evolution. Such a culture may well be fragile, easily lost by, attempts at external control and vulnerable to changes in fashion (especially vulnerable to thinking of itself merely as fashion). Just as it is the role of a 'scientific community' within society to develop and nurture the conditions for scientific understanding, so a similar role can be reserved for the community of art and design. This is not to say that the two communities of understanding cannot co-habit - and need to cooperate - within a larger society but their different tasks cannot be reduced to one another. On Kant's view what he called, in the spirit of the Enlightenment, a 'progressive society' is not possible unless these complementary cultures coexist and develop.

The most appropriate term for knowledge of works might well be 'knowledge by acquaintance' as opposed to knowledge by description, for it is the direct demonstration of products of aesthetic achievement that is in question here. Unfortunately, long ago Russell highjacked that English idiom for other purposes. Within the modern empiricist tradition 'knowledge by acquaintance' has long been a technical term for the inputs of the content of experience before it becomes adapted for or polluted by disputable theory. The idiom of acquaintance seems to leap across gaps as wide as those between 'taste' and 'Taste'. As Locke put one aspect of the matter 'no amount of words can describe to one who has not tasted it before the relish of that excellent fruit the pineapple' - we have to be acquainted

with flavours before we can find words for them - or have causal theories about them.. Not everyone can discriminate the flavours that others can, but when we can what we are acquainted with has the personal authority of experience. I do not wish here to enlarge on the further issues that such an empiricist programme of epistemology raises, though I do suspect that they gain some credibility by association with the popular idiom of acquaintance. This idiom remains vaguer and wider than empiricist terminology. Typically it is people who we may be acquainted with as opposed to merely knowing them by repute or report. The contrast here with the experience of tasting pineapple is obvious enough. Here the concept has nothing to do with anything basically 'given in' experience. The empiricist concept sought simplicity, this invokes complexity. Being able to become properly acquainted with people is never just given to us - or given to us so long as we have well-tuned senses. We need social skills, the development of subtleties of social perception, of tact, self confidence, trust, indeed the capacity to take pleasure in other people's company in order to begin to get properly acquainted with one another - such knowledge both requires and provides sociability. Obviously, learning how to be acquainted with (and to respect) works of art is radically unlike learning how to respect people. People are agents with feelings and wills of their own; of no product of art or design is that true. Yet such works are the productions of people and as such demonstrate 'an animating principle of the mind'. Moreover, the modernist slogan of respect for materials as a condition of good work, does have its analogy with respect for people: in each case it is hard to follow even the best precepts if one does not enjoy the intimacy of the 'materials' of good practice. To the extent that this slogan is no longer fashionable there may also be analogies with moral practice. At the risk of a bad philosophical pun, my claim it that knowledge of works is a task of knowledge by acquaintance, involving great complexity, and that it is not the least of the tasks of education in the arts to defend that complexity.

Endnotes

1 for an account of knowledge as what is transmissible see [Welbourne 1987, 2001]It is also worth noting Kant's observation; 'without [the possibility of being universally communicated] this subjective condition of the act of knowing, knowledge, as an effect would not arise' [Kant 1961]p. 83 All my references to Kant in what follows are to the Meredith's translation of the Critique of Judgement, Page references are to this translation. I make no apology for adding in the notes and text some quite lengthy quotations from the Critique; there are many current views concerning Kant's arguments there, and it is well if my own opinions are moderately supported by quotation from what seem to be the less well-know aspects of his discussion.

2 see [Aristotle 1955] p.200

3 see [Kant 1961] p.151

4 [Kant 1961] Pt.1 Bk.II. Sec.40. p 154

5 [Kant 1961] p 153

6 [Kant 1961] p154

7 see [Wollheim 1987]

8 [Kant 1961] p183

9 see [Kant 1961]: sec. 60 , his final section, p226
"The propaedeutic to all fine art, so far as the highest degree of its perfection is what is in view, appears to lie not in precepts, but in the culture of the mental powers produced by a sound preparatory education in what are called the humaniora - so called, presumably, because humanity signifies, on the one hand, the universal feeling of sympathy, and on the other, the faculty of being able to communicate universally one's inmost self - properties constituting in conjunction the befitting social spirit of mankind, in contradistinction to the narrow life of the lower animals." (Kant's emphases) Compare also Part II section 21 p.97
"Fine art and the sciences, if they do not make man morally better, yet, by conveying a pleasure that admits of universal communication...make him civilised....and so prepare man for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have sway."

10 Given Kant's firm distinction between aesthetic judgment and moral judgements the final sentence of the whole argument in Part I of the Critique may come as a surprise: "This makes it clear that the true propaedeutic for laying the foundations of taste is the development of moral ideas and the culture of the moral feeling. For only when sensibility is brought into harmony with moral feeling can taste assume a definite unchangeable form."[Kant 1961] p.227

11 Kant's account of the academy would not be ours though it fits well with academic practice of his time, and is not too far from that apparent in Reynolds' Discourses to the Royal Academy. What is significant is that while he insists on the power of practical example in art education he distinguishes it from 'precepts' yet finds the form of learning ‘difficult to explain'. Why a student can follow an example rather than imitate it puzzles him. For all that his recognition of this fact lies at heart of his own account. He says, "Seeing then, that the natural endowment of art (as fine art) must furnish the rule, what kind of rule must this be? It cannot be one set down in a formula and serving as a precept - for the judgement upon the beautiful would be determinable according to concepts. Rather must the rule be gathered from the performance, i.e. from the product which others may use to put their own talent to the test, so as to let it serve as a model, not for imitation but for following. The possibility of this is difficult to explain. The artist's ideas arouse like ideas on the part of his pupil, presuming nature to have visited him with a like proportion of the mental powers. For this reason the models of fine art are the only means for handing down this art to posterity. This is something that cannot be done by mere descriptions..... Despite the marked difference that distinguishes the mechanical art....depending upon industry and learning, from fine art, as that of genius, there is still no fine art in which something mechanical, capable of being at once comprehended and followed in obedience to rules, and consequently something academic does not constitute the essential condition of the art Now, seeing that originality of talent is one (though not the sole) essential factor that goes to make up the character of genius, shallow minds fancy that the best evidence they can give of their being full-blown geniuses is by emancipating themselves from all academic constraint of rules, in the belief that one cuts a finer figure on an ill tempered than on a trained horse".[Kant 1961] p.171

12 see however [Kant 1961] p 174. Here Kant does seem to have a conception of the maker developing a pattern of aesthetic judgements of his own work within a process, rather than by 'inspiration'. This is why 'taste merely' is required
'...the beautiful representation of an object, which is properly only the form of the presentation of a concept, and the means by which the latter is universally communicated. To give this form, however, to the product of fine art, taste merely is required. By this the artist, having practices and corrected his taste by a variety of examples from nature or art,

controls his work and, after many and often laborious attempts to satisfy taste, finds the form which commend s itself to him. Hence this form is not, as it were a matter of inspiration, or a free swing of the mental powers, but rather of a slow and even .painful process of improvement, directed to making the form adequate to his thought without prejudice to the freedom in play of those powers..'

13 See [Harrison 1978]

14 See [Collingwood,1938] Note that while Kant mostly refers to taste as the faculty of universally communicating feelings 'without recourse to concepts', in his final paragraph of Part 1 of the Critique he refers to taste as 'a critical faculty that judges of the rendering of moral ideas in terms of sense' (My emphasis.)

15 Richard Wollheim for example, in Painting as an Art, [Wollheim 1987]p.358 commenting on Michael Baxandall's insistence in Patterns of Intention [Baxandall 1985] that an artist's form of compositional thought is essentially a process in which 'the artist's intention is formed and re-formed over time and indeed even as he paints' agrees but says 'I do not attach to it the same theoretical weight as he does'. After all, it is paintings as works of art that we have to come to terms with, not (or not normally) studios and sketch books or incomplete drafts. Interestingly, Wollheim does not object to Baxandall's discussion of intention as a whole.

16 I should perhaps stress that I do not read Kant as an apostle of abstraction in the visual arts, or in art in general. Despite what he says in the Moments, it is significant that the most 'abstract' art for his time, namely music without words, gave him most difficulty.

17 I have argued this in Harrison 1978. In that book I gave less acknowledgement than I should have done to Collingwood's views, largely because I then felt myself to be a significant distance from both his idealism concerning art and his location of the creative process within a conception of expression that had, it seemed to be then, and still does, a far more insistent connection with the idea of emotional expression than seemed healthy.

18 How fortunate is worth pondering. We have a far richer work from knowing the stages of thought that went into the evolution of London than if we simply had the final version to go on. On the other hand not all of this aspect of Blake's writing is an accident. The Songs of Experience, for example, articulate a process of debate with the Songs of Innocence and Blake's presentation of these works is designed to make that manifest. That this is an exception to most literary practice doesn't undermine its significance.

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