Interpreting the rhetoric of contextual instrumentality
Alan Robertson
Unitec, NZ
<joetal@kiwilink.co.nz>

Introduction

This paper will examine the instrumental role of academic 'texts' and 'books' as rhetorical contexts for the reception and interpretation of research artefacts. While texts and books act as significant contexts for all academic research, the particular research artefact which inspired this paper, 'Evaluating Curriculum Proposals: a critical guide' by Digby Anderson, also interprets the rhetorical operations of book design/typography/organisation as visual contexts contributing to the plausibility and authority of published research.

There are four reasons why 'Evaluating Curriculum Proposals' (ECP) is appropriate for this study. First, it is a research book which critiques the (con)texts of research books. Second, as it applies the process of rhetorical analysis to research texts (and books) it explicates that process, in the process. That is, it declares itself to be providing practical methods of analysis for others to use in other contexts. Third, one of those 'other' contexts to which it applies rhetorical analysis is the typographic domain of design practice — book, information, editorial — not usually considered rhetorical: few studies engage with the rhetorical dimension of design in fields other than advertising. Fourth, as a sociologist Anderson sees the instrumentality of that context with fresh eyes, critically free of specialist baggage.

The paper will historically contextualise first 'the book' as a rhetorical construct; then 'rhetorical analysis' ('the new rhetoric', the 'rhetoric of enquiry'). It will introduce 'Evaluating Curriculum Proposals', commenting on it within the context of first, communication design, then of Nigel Blake's 'Rhetoric and the problem of honest design' in Information Design Journal 2(2), the book review published the same year.

In the beginning was the word

It was no accident that the original 'western' printed book was The Bible. Neither was it an accident that it was intended to deceive through its simulation of hand-scribed text. In
Renaissance Europe The Bible embodied not only unassailable 'truth-as-authority' and rhetorical power but great prestige as a book-artefact. Gutenberg's 42 line Bible, complete as it was with over 300 separate 'characters', was designed to persuade each wealthy new 'owner' that their particular 'edition' was as exclusive as any one-off, painstakingly hand-scribed 'original' (McLean, 1980: 14). In short, the 'formal content' of the first typographic book was designed to serve the rhetorical needs of both its 'message content' and its publisher.

Printed books enabled the unprecedented global dissemination of ideas. Any individual could step from the obedient 'darkness' of the prevailing corporatised belief-system into the 'light' of systematic rational enquiry premised on the critical evaluation of invention and discovery. This was the historical moment when the 'old' truth of 'authority-by-telling' shifted towards the 'new' truth of 'authority-by-reasoning-and-sense-perception' (Fernandez-Armesto 1997: 81). In parallel with the empirical rigour of scientific method philosophy framed metaphysical critique through the dialectical testing of truth claims by logical disputation. That these advances were enabled by the mass-produced typographic text/book is taken for granted as a 'technological' sidebar. Yet it was by book-broadband that the new knowledge was distributed: the new belief system of scientific research, discovery and invention; the new truth-orthodoxies of rational empiricism and logical positivism.

Today, human progress is synonymous with scientific/technological research. Research embodies investigation which culminates in understanding and new knowledge of the world. It is implicit that invention and discovery are guided 'by a sense of responsibility for advancing the growth of truth' and to this end the researcher/knower makes 'personal judgments exercised responsibly with a view to a [hidden] reality with which [s/he] is seeking to establish contact' (Polanyi and Prosch, 1977: 194). That 'hidden reality' (truth?) might be termed a 'holistic imaginative achievement of meaning' (ibid: 73) which, when it is presented to peers or others within the research or broader community, is critiqued and warranted as reasonably 'true'. But however 'truth' is defined it is 'given form only as the community of scientists [and scholars, judges, artists] is free to work out what its form is — and this task is never finished' (ibid: 204).

Polanyi defines the word 'true' as 'expressing the asseveration of the sentence to which it refers' — by which he means that in any truth-claim a sentence is first asserted, then stated to be true. While the assertion stresses the personal character of the knowledge and the statement 'solemnly declares' its universal intention, both constitute 'personal endorsements' of the claim (Polanyi 1958: 255). It follows then that the process of knowledge acquisition is contingent upon both 'the truth of a factual sentence [being] equivalent to the rightness of its assertion' and the implicit mutual determination of truth-belief within scientific method (ibid: 333n). To engage in research means to believe that

in spite of the hazards involved, I am called upon to search for the truth and state my findings' [and that that statement] must therefore prove consistent with its content by practising what it authorizes. This is indeed true. For in uttering this sentence I both say that I must commit myself by thought and speech, and do so at the same time. Any enquiry into our ultimate beliefs can be consistent only if it presupposes its own conclusions. It must be intentionally circular' (ibid: 299).

Hence the place of research at the pinnacle of scholarly practice. And hence the 'grading' of academics by the quality (and quantity) of their research outcomes. Universities wage intense public relations for pre-eminence and survival in the 'research university' wars. And
the most potent weapon — rated '1.0' in the all-important PBRF 1 rankings — is a double-blind, internationally peer-reviewed book published by a university press.

This is because research's authority has always been synonymous with its mode of dissemination: because scientific analytic thought was made possible through writing not only science but the professions maintained disciplinary prestige and authority through books kept in university libraries (Ong, 1977: 215). Books conferred professional credibility as repositories for new knowledge extracted from research. Books constituted the 'fount of truth' (pun intended) by which privilege and power were underwritten. Yet while the editorial, formal and economic conventions of the published book have undergone more than five hundred years of continual refinement the hegemony of their rhetorical operation has been rarely examined.

Ideas do not come 'naked'. Books are texts are words are alphabetic letters. These are the abstract forms of 'formal content' which construct the context for the abstract ideas, concepts and theories of 'message content'. Both 'forms' of 'content' are meaningful. This is why ordinary language can be ordinary enough to enable 'communication'. Texts must operate rhetorically upon their audience because they are inevitably cast in 'natural language' and the coherence of natural language, as a social construct, is always subject to the critical deconstruction of its necessarily 'suppressed contradictions' (Fish, 1990: 215). Language is a locally-situated practice used to describe the world; it is necessarily interested and rhetorical. So too, the book — with its sophisticated publication (and publishing) conventions — operates as a communicative artefact, constituted of practice, whose users tend to be blind to its rhetorical operation upon them as a 'book-construct'. Readers tend to look unselfconsciously but critically through the seeming transparency of both artefact and text to the 'message content' (the theory?) not self-consciously at the 'formal content' (the practice?) by which they are also directed towards and persuaded by the authorial voice. This is Richard Lanham's 'bi-stable decorum' wherein the 'quote marks' of the deconstructive turn identify that ironic toggle of perception by which the rhetoricality of the 'message' can be literally seen as a construct of its formality (Lanham, 1994: 81).

The valorisation of theory over practice derived in (large) part from the necessity of 'rationalisation' through texts. It was conveniently forgotten that practice is not predicated on theory; not a 'stepchild' of theory until Ryle revisited that particular assumption about the nature of knowledge. And in 1958 when the chemist Michael Polanyi demonstrated, with all the rhetorical authority of the University of Chicago Press — and his own text — that even scientists were human too, positivism's gleaming certainty began to fade. As 'an active comprehension of the things known, an action that requires skill' the making of a practical or theoretical 'skilful achievement' instantiates an 'irreversible' change of being which cannot be objectively critiqued because the 'hitherto fixed framework' against which the change might be tested had been altered by new comprehension (Polanyi, 1974: vii). This conception of a 'tacit personal knowledge' equipped practitioners with a powerful rationale for the truth-validity of their practice-derived theory. Finally, four years later, Thomas Kuhn and J.L. Austin demolished the dual myth of scientific objectivity and neutrality. Their seminal texts/books signalled the turn towards the 'rhetoric of enquiry'.

The rhetorical turn

Rhetoric was 'overwhelmingly relevant' within western culture until its performance shifted conclusively from oral to written word. Paradoxically, the very concept of public speaking as an 'art' — that is, a 'body of sequentially organised, scientific principles which explained and abetted what verbal persuasion consisted in' — was a direct function of writing (Ong,
1996: 109). But once writing replaced memory the dialectic worldview of the philosopher — the dialectic certainty of absolute truth — gained a long-sought traction over the rhetorical worldview — the ineffable contingency of life, of the living moment: 'the logical, if unconscious, basis of [a] common view of art as a response to a rhetorical challenge unconstrained by external principles' (Kennedy quoted in Lanham, 1969: 88).

In 'Arguments in Rhetoric against Quintilian' (1549) Peter Ramus (Pierre de la Ramee 1515-1572) — less than a century after Gutenberg — 'ordained' that invention and arrangement should become philosophy, and style and delivery should remain as 'the only true parts of the art of rhetoric'. Memory was removed completely — the book as a repository of knowledge made memory redundant. This surgical removal of speech (mere cosmetic rhetoric) from thought (dialectic reason) after nearly two millennia reduced holistic learning to 'self-standing and self-sealing divisions, divisions that later became academic disciplines' (Lanham, 1994: 158). The concept of language was formalised as 'value-free and ideally transparent' and reason assumed 'a Platonic self-standing freedom'. Once in a constant flux of shifting and overlapping relationships — everything viewed in terms of everything else — now the 'arts ought to consist of subjects that are constant, perpetual and unchanging, and they should consider only those concepts which Plato says are archetypal and eternal' (Ramus in Lanham, 1994: 158).

In the Ramist textbook 'a given subject had no acknowledged interchange with anything outside itself'. This made scientific discourse possible, singularly as 'science', but at a stroke disabled the holism integral to balanced humanistic enquiry. If thought could be separated from action and theory from practice, then henceforward philosophy could be pursued 'for its own sake' separate from ethics, religion and public life. Not only was the idea of truth as articulation of an integral wholeness of the world — a balance of felt, authoritative, reasoned and sensed knowledge — demolished, but rhetoric as the 'determinative and essentially creative' driver of 'open-ended-truth-making-by-argument' was excised from the longstanding 'paideia', the 'discipline of discourse' (Lanham 1994: 155-6). Once ideas, reason and design were removed from it, rhetoric was reduced to the surface personality of style and the expressive finesse of its delivery. It became moribund as 'serious' discourse until the 'rhetorical turn' of the late 1950's, when all those non-logical or counter-logical figurative elements, long regarded as 'merely ornamental' but by which standard meanings were shaped to effect, were again recognised as intrinsic to the way the authorial world was imposed upon the reader (Abrams, 1988: 159). Bryant's comprehensive definition returned rhetoric to the centre of virtually all human discourse: 'those principles, theories, laws, hypotheses, and other statable propositions which govern and explain the making and the functioning of symbolic communicative efforts through which [humans] direct and control each other's beliefs, convictions, and behaviour' (Bryant, 1973: 4). In other words rhetoric was the way that what was argued to be true was communicated within a discourse community. Once Austin had confirmed that language is situation-specific — that the meaning of utterances depends on the relationship between local contexts of production and similarly contextual moments of reception — Derrida could declare that meaning can only be constructed interpretively on the basis of speaker intention. Any utterance, any text is as contingent, constructed and socially mediated as any other because it 'rests on a contradiction it cannot acknowledge, rests on the suppression of the challengeable rhetoricity of its own standpoint' (Fish, 1990: 215). There cannot be an abstraction known as Truth because the truth is that every assertion is designed to persuade an audience (McCloskey in Fish, 1990: 210).

'Truth' for McCloskey here is likely to mean 'a special kind of truth... a higher kind of [unchanging, non-relative] truth' which 'smacks of dogmatism, authoritarianism, a belief in
the timeless and universal' (Eagleton 2006: 103). And while this 'ideal of an impersonally
detached truth' (Polanyi, 1974: 71) is indeed untenable, and while it is also true that
communication is rhetorical, it cannot be true that truth-claims cannot be made and that
truth is so relative as to equate with untruth. Asserting research-findings as 'true' not only
explicitly claims 'universal validity', it is a responsible act of knowing which is objective
inasmuch as it establishes contact with a 'hidden reality; a contact that is defined as the
condition for anticipating an indeterminate range of yet unknown (and perhaps yet
inconceivable) true implications' (ibid: vii-viii).

During the 1970's not only the natural and human sciences but professional power came
under the scrutiny of the rhetoric of enquiry. It found scholars dissecting widespread
disciplinary assumptions. Weigert's analysis of the generic characteristics of 'professional
rhetorics' is still a useful reminder of the contextual problematic of institutional power: It
specifies a rhetoric of high status affiliation which distances itself from lower status;
specialist expertise which claims theoretical validity; a public service commitment which
glosses careerist motivations; 'credentialling' policies which are justified and regulated;
self-policing designed to eliminate outsider 'interference'; systematic delegitimising the
rhetoric of outsiders; and ironically of course, not viewing these genres of rhetoric as
rhetorical' (Simons, 1989: 111). In short, the end of any rhetoric of enquiry is disclosure of
a 'social situation'.

If truth claims can only be understood by analysis of the 'textual strategies' which
'unobtrusively' shape their authority then both academic and academic writers' authorships
reveal the shared 'inventional patterns' of the institutional context in which they are written
(Hariman, 1989: 213). Scholarly artefacts are interpreted as disciplinary knowledge
identified and proscribed by the technocratic expertise of the academy; they are a product
of a certain kind of Foucauldian social control. As departmentalised, 'spatially' defined and
discretely specialist all knowledge (including rhetoric's understanding of its own rhetoric) is
defined and validated by the bestowing of already constituted power. And unwelcome
knowledge — like rhetorical critique — becomes 'subjugated' by the status quo or simply
excluded (Hariman, 1989: 216).

Rhetorical criticism had come full circle: it was again criticising the academy, a public
sphere of sorts, from within. Perhaps it might even once again take action in the public
sphere. But how? And would it? It was during the early days of this mainly American
rhetorical moment that Anderson's 'critical guide' appeared in the UK.

The book as (con)text: typographic and artefactual

'Evaluating Curriculum Proposals: a critical guide' by Digby Anderson is organised into six
chapters over 178 pages. The first chapter introduces rationale and method. In each of the
remaining five an excerpted text from a different 'practical' curriculum research book is
'unscrupulously' analysed. (Their titles follow the outlined chapters below.) Each analysis
demonstrates how the particular book from which it is excerpted achieves plausibility and
authority for its particular claims using a variety of rhetorical techniques.

Chapter 1, 'The Prospective Textual Evaluation of Curriculum Proposals', explains why
curriculum innovations must be 'prospectively evaluated' by means of textual analysis.
Anderson will not analyse five curriculum proposals but rather excerpted texts from them;
he declares from the outset that he is more interested in the interrelationship of text and
idea than the proposals. Because 'the rhetoric of academic argument' is cast in 'natural
language', with all its 'suggestion' and 'allusion'; because it comes in the form of books;
and because it exemplifies 'the sort of academic text which is preceded by research, allegedly practical, quasi-scientific, strategically dependent on borrowed matter and rhetorically ornamental' it requires special methods of criticism (Anderson, 1981: 21).

Chapter 2, 'Persuasive Curricular Proposals', first analyses, over nine pages, the 'prefacial' features by which typographic design interventions constitute a significant rhetorical intervention hardly noticed by readers but which subtly influences them toward the authority and plausibility sought by the author. Then he analyses how textual message content is determined by the formal content; that is, by the way authors use words in texts, and how taken-for-granted editorial design features constitute a rhetoricality of 'bookish' presentation. For example, authority is achieved through juxtaposition (covers, title pages), sequence (contents list), borrowed research (citations) and lists (bullet-points). In these ways the book achieves credibility through its perceived relevance, authority, factuality or rigour ('the result of' research) and novelty. ('Moral Education in the Secondary School'. Schools Council, 1972.)

Chapter 3, 'The Development of Argument', demonstrates how a text achieves an apparently rational argument through rhetorical means. Three techniques used are presenting the proposal as though new, suggesting integrity through the use of terms as though they comprise a 'sort of moral grammar', and inflating key parts into a 'full-blown' approach. (The Humanities Project: an introduction'. Schools Council/Nuffield Humanities.)

Chapter 4, 'Presenting Research', analyses the way presented research in the form of tables, explanations of tables, diagrams, and accounts on which an argument is allegedly 'based', is interpolated into the text 'by editorial design' to sustain an argument's plausibility, and to achieve a greater rhetorical effect than the particular 'research' material might seem to justify. Spread over twenty-three pages, this is the longest section to focus on communication design. Anderson describes a diagram as a 'fanciful manufacture' which functions elliptically, leaving the reader to conclude how allegorical or isomorphic the message is intended to be (Anderson, 1981: 115). Their great (almost infinite) formal variety and 'variable approximation' to literary illustration engender great rhetorical potential. Diagrams enable almost total authorial freedom because they are layered with suggestion and implication. Like tables they can be readily interpolated within the text, and operate with the same serial and collective effect. But their best rhetorical function is to summarise (or appear to summarise) what would otherwise be dense prose. All of these interpolated materials can be read generatively (as natural language is read) for implications about the book, the authors, the research, the argument. ('Mass Media and the Secondary School'. Schools Council Research Study, 1973.)

Chapters 5, 'Borrowing Verisimilitude', reiterates the significance of borrowing, already discussed in Chapter 2. Authors instrumentally borrow practitioner context in order to 'connect' convincingly with practitioner-readers; to seem 'like one of us'. But this entails the rhetorical tasks of 'cutting out' and 'working up' borrowed speech. Quotations are designed (legitimately) to serve authorial theorising, not audience application. For them verisimilitude is required as evidence of the proposal's relevance. It is a rhetorical technique of research presentation, not presenting research. ('Religious Education in Primary Schools: discovering an approach'. Schools Council 1977.)

Chapter 6, 'The Rhetoric of Practicality', argues that the purported 'practicality' of proposals had to be rhetorically achieved because it didn't fit with actual practice. They were, in effect, theory not practice-derived. The underlying factors that produce classroom problems are described with accompanying transcripts of actual teacher/pupil exchanges.
A typical proposal is contrasted with the way the same kind of topic is actually 'taught' in the classroom. A brief concluding 'postscript' reiterates that the rhetoricality of texts is 'not a fault' but rather, 'inevitable', given their framing in natural language. ('Think well 5-13: Introduction and planning booklet'. Schools Council Health Education Project, 1977.)

Rhetorical analysis in/of communication design

For its intended audience, the harried evaluator of education research 'rhetoric' 'the secret story' (Blake's phrase) in 'Evaluating Curriculum Proposals' must have been the read of the week. The last chapter alone is worth the price: the 'real' language — in careful transcript — of genuine pupil/teacher classroom interaction, contextualized within Anderson's spare, discursive text-voice.

For communication designers Anderson's book highlights a different mode of criticality. Jan van Toorn's 'operational critique' is analogous to its spirit, but not framed as rhetorical analysis, and missing the practical guidance. Within design literature mention of rhetoric is comparatively light, and mainly descriptive, using visual examples to illustrate its operation in and for practice; but not as an instrument with which to effect analysis of practice.

Williamson's seminal studies (from the same era) focus on advertising using semiotic analysis. Bonsiepe, Ehses and Frascara all discuss both rhetoric and semiotic analysis but also in terms of advertising. Frascara comes closest to performing sustained rhetorical analysis in 'User-centred Graphic Design'. But it too is largely focused on advertising, not on 'ordinary' straight-text scholarly books.

Even Kinross (1989) who situates information design within historical and modernist contexts, uses only a dictionary definition of rhetoric. He does however cite a crucial contradiction in Bonsiepe (1965) which at once positions rhetoric as the inevitable consequence of any formal intervention by a graphic designer, yet also suggests that there are occasions such as railway timetables or logarithmic tables where 'information [might be] innocent of all taint of rhetoric'. Kinross extends this to demonstrate that 'eloquence' with typographic language is the true end of communicative visuality. Yet Bonsiepe's contextualising of rhetoric with words like 'infiltration' and 'taint' suggests more than a frisson of the pejorative. As though, despite acknowledging its inevitability for communication — indeed, that which makes human communication human — he would somehow rather it did not. However his revised 1999 translation not only succinctly introduces traditional textual rhetoric but also includes thirty invaluable examples of rhetorical figures illustrated with print advertisements. It is appropriate too that Bonsiepe should put 'style' forward as the component of rhetoric most relevant for contemporary design. Arguably too, the original, ancient elements of rhetoric (apart from memory) match those of contemporary design process. After all, does not the communication designer invent a compelling visual argument, arrange it by design using manifold figures of style (rhetorical tropes and schemes) and deliver it with 'effect and charm'?

In the same book in which Ehses' students illustrate rhetorical figures with posters Buchanan argues for the significant distinction in design between theories of rhetoric and semiotics, and that rhetoric might well provide the necessary context for a theory of design. Even Boekraad, who describes rhetoric in terms of Vico's 'practical reasoning', and briefly contextualises it with 'classic book typography' does little more than that. He does however remind us that graphic design is a quintessentially rhetorical practice.
Waller too discusses rhetoric within a typographic context and possibly comes closest to Anderson by alluding to Stanley Morison's view of the authority typography brings to bear on the text, and within whose constraints typographers are obliged to work. Yet he does not suggest this as an example of the rhetoricality of formal content. Not only did Waller cite ECP in his 1988 PhD thesis but he edited both 'Information Design Journal 2/2' in which Blake's review appeared, and an earlier issue (Volume 2 1979) in which Anderson was a co-contributor.

What Anderson has performed, then, is analysis of the impact of Morison's typographic authority upon the innocent reader, but not in the language of communication design. He explains that even the most mundane text/image juxtaposition constitutes a generically rhetorical artefact. It is hard not to accept that typographic design would not exist in any form if persuasion were not the intent. That 'information' might exist outside human compass, as 'merely' factual and thus neutral in its abstraction is just another illusion of objectivism. If information is 'a difference that makes a difference' then it must make a difference to someone. And every 'someone' is an emotional subject. Thus defining rhetoric as those 'seductive heuristics' (Bonsiepe, 1999: 69) by which the message-receiver's moods and feelings may be influenced puts it at the centre of all communications, from verbal through visible to visual; that is, from spoken, through written/typographic, to typog|raphic communication.

Apposite too is Richards' description of a book as 'a machine to think with'. Contending that the heuristic power of language constitutes its instrumentality for making rhetorical meaning he argues that just as 'problems are formed through instruments' so meanings are the means of problematizing language (Richards, 1991: 282). This too was Anderson's intention; but not, perhaps, the object of Nigel Blake's book review.

The book review as instrumental context

In the same year it was published 'Evaluating Curriculum Proposals' (ECP) was critically reviewed at length by educational theorist and philosopher Nigel Blake in 'Information Design Journal 2/2' (IDJ). 'Rhetoric and the problem of honest design' is notable both for its relatively early appearance within an important design research context — IDJ was established in 1979 — and for the fact that he too was not a design practitioner, theorist or historian. But because the review both praises and excoriates Anderson it provides opportunity to examine the rhetorical instrumentality of book review (con)text on the reception of the research book-as-artefact. While the rhetoricality of this authorial context, revealed through the text, is the putative need for the reviewer to be seen to perform a balanced critique, an analysis may more reveal both the power of the reviewer and their own view of their own power than provide a 'true' sense of the reviewed book.

Thus it also provides a (con)text within which to attempt to practise the kind of rhetorical analysis performed by Anderson in ECP. Throughout his review Blake periodically inserts reference to the significance of ECP for 'information-design' even though Anderson's design analysis is relevant and interesting for all communication designers and particularly editorial designers. It must be noted that Anderson himself rarely uses the word design — occasionally in the authorial sense of 'designing a text' — and never the term 'information design'. Thus Blake's explicit catering to this specialised audience rings slightly false because he clearly takes exception with Anderson and it isn't over information design. It is about the ancient rift between theory and practice, between logical philosophy and (mere) rhetoric.
For Blake seems to so widely miss Anderson's crucial point — that his study is focused on the text, and only the text — that Blake's own text, possibly unbeknownst to him, is positively (or rather, 'positivistly') littered with all the subtle and unacknowledged rhetoricality of someone attempting to salvage the commonsense 'fact' that logical, rational argumentation must be achievable without rhetoric. It is as difficult to contextualize the impact of this communicative dilemma for the reader of this paper, as it probably was for Blake to rationally and fairly depict Anderson's allegedly illogical, 'contentious' and even 'eccentric' failings for the readers of IDJ; and indeed as it may even have been for Anderson to fairly present 'his' curricular authors' rhetorical shortcomings, for the readers of ECP. Perhaps this is another reason why Blake seems at times to mock: he is defending reason against 'insidious' and 'covert' rhetorical 'falsehood', not to mention all-out 'guile'. Throughout, he repeats his belief in 'sound' argument. Yet his own methods and intentions become suspect. Here is an example. In the middle of a substantial quote from Anderson, Blake inserts his own 'interpolation' (below, within square brackets) — legitimately it seems — until you read the original in Anderson.

'This little table is a glimpse of the vast enterprise of research 'behind' the book. The table then is a device which may help the author successfully bring off the 'there is research and there are presentations of research' split. His book can take on an exegetical style in which the prose part explains the interpolations. [Here the interpolated table. NB]... It allows (the author) to make prose appear to be a natural sequential development from the table where in fact the interpolated table is chosen by the author himself. Let us call these the critical effect and the structural effect. By the critical effect the reader has his critical scope organised for him by the author. By the structural effect the author uses interpolations to give his book an exegetical and sequential form to his own argumentative advantage. (ECP: 100)'.

The catch is that in the original text, at the point where 'NB' claims that Anderson has interpolated a table, there is no such thing. Instead, the following two sentences have been excised: 'These interpolations casually but cumulatively generate an awareness of the thing 'research-behind-the-book'. And this division is of enormous rhetorical benefit to the author.' Why would Blake commit this falsehood? Does it matter? It is probably a mistake. But the missing sentences do provide a reasonable rhetorical reference point for Anderson's argument, and without them Blake could more confidently begin his next paragraph with 'Now if the reader feels that there is plenty he jibs at in the analysis quoted above, then he shares my company.' And then, astonishingly, he adds 'However, the present point is the kind of conclusions Anderson draws. They have to do with issues of intellectual honesty.' [1]. The 'slip' above, though, is not particularly helpful for understanding textual analysis, and is probably best construed simply as an editing error. But then, later, Blake argues that rhetoric must embody guile... And while he appears to understand Anderson's essential principle that rhetorical analysis can expose how words inevitably deliver both non-rational and rational persuasion he insists that abstracting 'the bare bones of an argument' from a 'passage' (and which 'involves') 'rephrasing' or 'translating' the arguments 'into different words' will achieve 'logical analysis'. What he doesn't acknowledge is that those 'bare bones' will still be words. They have to be. There are no 'bare ideas'.

So he struggles (sincerely) to justify what he describes as two major faults in ECP. First that Anderson has 'mistaken' logical argument as 'a species of rhetoric' and secondly that that 'confusion' accounts for Anderson not prescribing 'any kind of recipe for eradicating rhetoric' (Blake, 1981: 88). But then, while arguing for the efficacy of re-presenting the same "argument" but without the 'rhetorical tricks' Blake waxes wonderfully rhetorical in a
passage against rhetoric — a 'rational' attempt to defend 'rational argument'. Unfortunately, as he himself resorts to all-out rhetorical trickery, he 'slips' again, apparently innocent of how it reads:

It will not be inappropriate to apply rhetorical analytic techniques to a good piece of rationally persuasive argument, providing that logical techniques are also applied. The latter should reveal the strengths of the argument while the former should fail to reveal weaknesses in presentation. ['fail to?'] It is also important to remember that a good, sturdy piece of rational argument can get overlain by a muddy varnish of cheap rhetoric. Ideally of course, logical analysis of arguments should be sufficient' (Blake, 1981: 88).

This extraordinary example of logical self-contradiction, committed during rational argument, comes complete with yet another error of expression ['fail to']. Yet his review may well have introduced many to Anderson who might not have discovered him otherwise. For that 'he deserves our indulgence as a mark of our thanks' (Blake, 1981: 90).

Conclusion

This paper has tried to examine the instrumental role of academic 'texts', 'books' and typographic design practice as rhetorical contexts for the reception and interpretation of research artefacts. It argued that Digby Anderson's book constitutes what may be a relatively early example of practical rhetorical analysis produced in the UK which analyses the instrumentality of the research context. His book constitutes the critical guide of its title for those interested in the rhetorical problematic of the academic research 'text/book'. For communication designers/researchers too this critical analysis of the suasive properties of 'ordinary' typographic visuality, editorial design and organisation — as well as the book-as-academic-publishing/business-artefact — may well be relevant.

Designed publications, and even the most austere scholarly book, operate simultaneously as both truth-assertion and self-propagandizing rhetoric. Similarly book and information design, respected professionally for their 'neutral' typographic visuality, are complicit in a rhetoric of 'seriousness', of seeming non-commercial disinterest, of arcane and specialist rigour. But, as Anderson pointed out, this is not a fault; it is the nature of human communication using 'natural language'. If there is a fault it is in denying that the imagination and poetry of persuasion underwrites the social construct humans call reality. Vico, the radical eighteenth century Italian philosopher, regarded as archetypal rhetor and the originator of cultural modernity, argued that culture can be understood primarily because it is a human construct; that what is true is what is made and the convergence of their interchangability is the principle driving a philosophy of culture. Books are made things. They do not embody the logic of science but rather the practical reasoning of rhetoric — image before concept, speech before argument (Paetzold, 1998: 36). 'What is eloquence if not wisdom expressed in an elegant manner, richly flowered and in accordance with healthy reasoning?' (Vico, quoted in Boekraad, 2000: 12).

Endnotes

1 PBRF: Performance Based Research Funding is the system used in New Zealand to determine allocation of government research funding.

References


to cite this journal article:

ISSN 1466-4917